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SEX DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
In amending the fair housing laws to include "sex" as a protected
category, both Congress' and the California Legislature2 have recently
acknowledged sex discrimination in rental housing to be a significant
problem requiring a remedy.3  Although these newly amended laws
do not provide the sole remedy for discriminatory housing practices, 4
the specific inclusion of "sex" within the fair housing acts provides for
broader enforcement 5 and generates greater publicity6 condemning
1. Civil Rights Act of 1968, tit. VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (Supp. V 1975),
amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1970).
2. The Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1964, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-
35745 (West Supp. 1977), amending CAL. HEALTH &_ SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35745
(West 1973).
3. Both statutes now make sex an unlawful basis for refusing to rent, to vary terms
or conditions of rental, to advertise a preference in a rental unit, or for aiding or
inducing such acts. California's amendment provides added protection by also prohibit-
ing discrimination on the basis of "marital status." This is a significant addition be-
cause it prevents a landlord from excluding "singles" and thereby discriminating against
women who are seeking housing without a man.
4. Other civil rights statutes that may provide relief on the federal level include
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) (1970). In California, the Unruh Civil Rights Act
was amended to include sex as a protected category in 1974 and 1976. CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 51-53 (West Supp. 1977), amending CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 51-53 (West 1970).
5. Historically, the most effective means of dealing with discrimination in property
transactions has been the use of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1970), a statute enacted to enforce the rights established by the thirteenth amendment.
In the landmark decision of Jones v. Alfred H. "Mayer Co., 392 U.S, 409 (1968),
§ '1982 was held to apply to private discrimination in the sale and rental of all private
property. Unfortunately, the Jones Court did not limit itself to expanding the class of
defendants in a § 1982 action. It also narrowed the class of plaintiffs to those suffering
"racial discrimination," stating that the statute "does not address itself to discrimination
on grounds of religion or national origin," nor, by implication, to discrimination on
grounds of sex. Id. at 413.
This interpretation has been extended to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), which guarantees
the right to make and enforce contracts on an equal basis. A growing number of
cases have held that sex bias is not within the scope of this statute. See, e.g., Troy
v. Shell Oil Co., 378 F. Supp. 1042, 1046 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd on other grounds, 519
F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1974); New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees,
Inc., 377 F. Supp. 481, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 512 F.2d 856
(2d Cir. 1975); League of Academic Women v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 343 F.
Supp. 636, 638-40 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Contra, Parmer v. National Cash Register Co.,
346 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Ohio 1972). For a discussion of the arguments in favor
of extending the application of § 1981 to sex discrimination, see Stanley, Sex Discrimina-
tion and Section 1981, 1 WOMEN'S RiGHTs L. REP. 2, 7-8 (1973).
Without the broad coverage of §§ 1981 and 1982, federal relief for sex discrimi-
nation in housing was, until the amendment to title VIII, limited to the more specific
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these practices than would otherwise exist.
To date, the new statutes have received scant attention, and the fair
housing law amendments were enacted with little debate. While the
financial aid portions of the Federal Housing and Development Act of
1974 were discussed at length by the Congress, the section prohibiting
sex-based discrimination in housing was given only token reference. 8
In California, the opposition to passage of the amendment to the Rum-
ford Fair Housing Act centered upon equal treatment regardless of
"marital status" rather than equal treatment regardless of sex.' The
fact situations required to prove a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985
(3). See notes 145-84 infra and accompanying text.
6. Many women fail to perceive sex-based discrimination when it occurs. McKinney,
Housing--Women, Kids Not Wanted, Oakland Tribune, Mar. 10, 1975, at EE 17, col. 3
[hereinafter cited as Oakland Tribune]. Even if they feel they have been the victims
of bias, many women are so glad to find housing that they will not "make waves"
or complain after they have found a place to live. Id. Moreover, as many women
do not know that discrimination in the rental of housing is illegal, they are unfamiliar
with available remedies. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NEGRO WOMEN, INC., WOMEN & Hous-
ING: A REPORT ON SEX DISCRIMINATION IN FiVE AMERICAN CITIES 128-30 (1975)
(published by the U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev.) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN
& HoUsING].
7. Only two major considerations of the problem have been undertaken previously.
WOMEN & HOUSING, supra note 6; Note, Pioneering Approaches to Confront Sex Bias
in Housing, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 79 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sex Bias in Housing].
8. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808, 88 Stat. 729, amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1970).
The only comment on the proposed section was made by Senator Brock:
Another important provision in the bill is section [3610] designed to prevent dis-
crimination on the basis of sex in housing. This section is patterned after the Fair
Housing Opportunity Act which I introduced during the last session of Congress
after it had come to my attention that in too many cases, women are discriminated
against in housing transactions. For example, very often a wife's income is not
counted toward a purchase of a home. Section [3610] would amend the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 to include as a prohibited activity discrimination on the basis
of sex in housing transactions.
120 CONG. Rnc. 3353 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1974).
9. California State Senator Petris has pointed out both the lack of information on
the problem and the focus of the debate surrounding Cal. S.B. 844, law of Sept. 30,
1975, now found in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35745 (West Supp. 1977),
amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35745 (West 1973), in a letter written
before its passage:
It is true that there is little statistical information on the extent of sex discrimina-
tion in housing; however the passage of legislation to prohibit such discrimination
does not require a showing of extensive discrimination. Some women have experi-
enced the problem of discrimination, and the mechanism which already exists for
dealing with racial discrimination can be broadened to cover sex discrimination.
It is a wrong which requires a remedy.
, * . [We can only get valid statistics after we have established a method of
proving individual cases, and that is what the bill will accomplish. Hopefully, its
enactment will reduce the extent of discrimination, so that the incidence of sex dis-
crimination, whatever it may now be, will be reduced. But it doesn't seem to me
that there is any way of establishing its success in this regard.
Please note that SB 844 includes marital status discrimination. It is that aspect
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limited public awareness of the existing problem is the product of scat-
tered public hearings and newspaper articles10 relating reports of per-
sonal experiences.
This lack of public awareness is reflected in the paucity of sex dis-
crimination housing cases brought to date. The result is that evidence
of sex discrimination sufficient to justify legal action is undefined by
case law. Moreover, available remedies, the advisability of referral to
a governmental housing agency, and the advantages of the available
causes of action are equally unclear. In light of this lack of definition,
this comment will provide a guide for legal action in instances of sex
discrimination in rental housing under both federal and California
law.
11
I. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING AND PROVING
SEX DISCRIMINATION
In defining and proving sex discrimination,' 2 the concern is only with
of the bill which has generated most of the opposition. Included in marital status
is the question of whether cotenants are married to each other.
Letter from California State Senator Nicholas C. Petris, Chairman, Senate Select Com-
mittee on Housing and Urban Affairs to Elyse Kline (Aug. 7, 1975).
10. Public hearings provided the source of information in WOMEN & HoUSINO, supra
note 6. These hearings also generated newspaper publicity. Oakland Tribune, supra
note 6. Hearings have also been held in regard to the amendment of the Unruh
and Rumford Acts. In addition, the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) sponsored a conference on April 5-6, 1976 entitled Housing &
Community Development-Making It Work for Women. With some effort, additional
information may be obtained from government agencies and other fair housing organi-
zations. For example, HUD statistics show that 167 complaints based on sex discrimi-
nation were made under title VIII in fiscal 1975. Of these, 67 were in Region IX,
encompassing California, Arizona, Hawaii, and Nevada. In 1974, approximately
43% of all sex-based title VIH complaints originated in California. See letter from
A. Joyce Skinner, Director, Federal Women's Program, HUD to Elyse Kline (July
17, 1975).
The California Attorney General's office reported that, before the Rumford Act was
amended, about one complaint alleging sex discrimination in housing was received each
week. Most complaints involved widows or divorced women with children trying to
rent apartments or spaces in mobile home parks. Interview with Judith Ashmann,
Deputy Attorney General, in Los Angeles (May 29, 1975).
In the central Los Angeles area, the Fair Housing Congress of Southern California
received 239 complaints of discrimination between October, 1974, and June, 1975. Of
these, twelve cases clearly involved sex bias, although some also contained racial issues.
Interview with Staff, Fair Housing Congress of Southern California in Los Angeles
(July 2, 1975).
11. The focus of this comment will be on discrimination against women in housing,
but the principles discussed herein are equally applicable to discrimination against men.
See P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HOuSING REP. BULL. 1 14.4 (Feb. 24, 1975).
12. Despite the paucity of sex discrimination cases, it is nonetheless possible to formu-
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whether the fact of discrimination is present.'" Proof of the fact of
discrimination can be direct14 or circumstantial.' 5
The existence of discrimination can be exposed circumstantially by
reference to the facts surrounding the refusal to rent,' 6 the proportion
of tenants of one sex presently living in the building,' 7 the subsequent
acceptance of similarly situated tenants of the other sex,' or the ques-
tionable validity of the reasons given for the refusal.' 9 If the unit is
still available for occupancy after the complainant was told it was rented,
late criteria for identification of actionable discrimination by analogy to racial discrimi-
nation cases. That such analogy is appropriate may be inferred from the inclusion
of "sex" as a protected category along with "race" in the fair housing acts. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619 (Supp. V 1975); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35745 (West
Supp. 1977).
13. Fact is distinguished from intent to discriminate. Thus, discrimination may be
present even though the landlord is unaware that the criteria used for selecting tenants
result in the exclusion of single women from the dwelling. See United States v. Real
Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 782 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
Experience in conciliation has proved that the term "discrimination" means many
things to many people, depending upon their position in the discrimination process.
It is a rare case where there is specific evidence of a person's motivation to dis-
criminate. If motivation were necessary very few people would be proven guilty
of discrimination. All that is necessary is to prove the effects of his acts were dis-
criminatory. Intent may be inferred from the fact of the discrimination itself. Dis-
crimination, therefore, may be defined as any act or institutional practice which
adversely affects an individual's opportunity to rent, purchase, or enjoy decent hous-
ing because of race, color or creed.
Hearings on Federal Government's Role in the Achievement of Equal Opportunity
in Housing Before the Civil Rights Oversight Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, Subcomm. No. 4, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., ser. 34, at 599 (1972), quoting
U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., HUD Title VIII Field Operation Handbook, Pub.
No. E08020.1, at 46 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. By analogy, the discussion
is applicable to sex-based discrimination as well.
14. This occurs, for instance, when the landlord states, "I don't rent to single women."
Many examples were reported by Maxine Brown, Chairperson of the California Housing
Task Force of the National Organization for Women. Hearings on S.B. 1380 Before
the Cal. Senate Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 22, 1974).
15. See, e.g., Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 350 (7th Cir. 1970).
16. Id. In that case, where a black woman was falsely told that the apartment
was rented and that there was a policy against renting to employed mothers with
infant children, racial discrimination was at least a partial reason for the refusal.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal.
1973) (where there had been only 14 black tenants in 1,133 rental units prior to
filing of suit, a prima facie case of racial discrimination was established).
18. See, e.g., Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D.
Ill. 1972) (where two single black women were refused a lease because one of them
might get married, but two single white women who were testers were accepted, proof
of racial discrimination existed).
19. See, e.g., Stearns v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 6 Cal. 3d 205, 490
P.2d 1155, 98 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1971) (where a black man had to submit to a credit
investigation before renting an apartment but a white man did not, a discriminatory
application of rental requirements was established).
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if no single women live in the complex, or if a test is later made with
a less-qualified person of the other sex who is accepted as a tenant,
there will be sufficient grounds upon which to base a charge of dis-
crimination.2 °
The more difficult problem in proving sex discrimination arises
where the landlord states an apparently valid reason for refusing to rent
but actually bases his decision on improper bias. The landlord may
believe that he or she has legitimate grounds for refusing the appli-
cant-and the fact finder may agree that the reasons given are ade-
quate. Thus, it is imperative to appreciate the source of the bias and
to prepare to challenge it by probing beneath the surface of the stated
grounds for refusal in order to expose a landlord's stereotyped assump-
tions about women.21
Landlords have a justifiable concern in selecting tenants whom they
will not have to evict, who will pay their rent, and who will not cause
expensive damage. While the tenant's credit standing is relevant, a
landlord may fail to appreciate that a woman who has recently been
divorced, separated, or widowed may not have developed a credit rat-
ing of her own even though for years she paid the bills, kept the family
accounts in order, or held a job.
22
20. For a good explanation of how to investigate the facts of a housing discrimination
case, see LEADERSHIP COUNCIL FOR METROPOLITAN OPEN COMMUNITIES, GUIDE TO PRAC-
TICE OPEN HOUSING LAW 6-8 (1974). Although this pamphlet is concerned with racial
discrimination, the information it offers on how to handle a fair housing case is ex-
tremely valuable for any type of housing discrimination.
21. The assumptions are occasionally blatant, as with a New York woman who re-
ported that when she wore everyday clothes to apply for an apartment, she was told
by the landlord that he did not want any welfare mothers. When, on the other hand,
she got dressed up, she was told by the landlord that he did not want any hookers.
WOMEN & HOUSING, supra note 6, at 36. In another instance, when a San Francisco
woman asked to see a three-bedroom apartment for her family, renting for $400 per
month, the landlord told her that the deposit would be $100. When he learned she
was divorced, he added another $400 to the deposit. Id. at 38. The landlord was
not opposed to children in the building; he was opposed only to a single mother.
Apparently neutral grounds for refusal typically involve marital status. For example,
in Atlanta, a woman looking for an apartment was asked to fill out an elaborate
application by the landlord before being shown any units. She indicated on the applica-
tion that her marital status was "separated." The manager refused her application
because of a policy against renting to separated individuals. Id. at 40. Whether this
policy was neutrally applied to both sexes would have to be determined by investigation,
but often such policies are no more than a pretext for the assumption that a single
woman "would be bringing men into the house and destroying the property and just
giving them a bad name from the kind of house that she would run." Id. at 41.
22. The irony of these credit practices is that when a woman is divorced, separated
or widowed she is often denied credit . , . on the grounds that she has no estab-
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Landlords may assume that when a woman becomes bored with her
job, she will change to a less stable source of income or change her
marital status, thereby possibly altering her living arrangements. 3
Managers may also assume women are incapable of dealing with rou-
tine home maintenance and thus feel the property is better cared for
if there is a man on the premises.2 4 Other assumptions are that women
will have loud parties and that they will have men in their apartments
at late hours.25
A close examination of these and related assumptions will demon-
strate that they are too often false to be valid criteria for selecting ten-
ants. The assumption that single women form a more transient ten-
ant class ignores the fact that, in a transient society, changes in housing
needs may occur for all tenants. Moreover, the assumption that a
single woman's income is less stable than a single man's2 is unrealistic
where unemployment for a large proportion of the population is a fact
of life.27 Thus, the question should be whether the job held by the par-
ticular applicant pays enough to meet the rental obligation, whether it
has been held for a sufficient length of time, and whether it appears
secure.
Other assumptions regarding unacceptable forms of income tend to
fall most heavily on women. Since a woman is often dependent on
income derived from social security benefits, pension plans, annuities,
insurance benefits, trust distributions, welfare, alimony, or court-or-
dered child support,18 the assumption that any of these are necessarily
lished credit record. Many of these women could easily present a credit record
had they not been forced to give up their economic identity by creditors.
Representative Martha W. Griffiths, Opening Statement before the Joint Economic Com-
mittee Hearing on Discrimination Against Women in Credit (July 12, 1973), quoted
in 1 WOMEN'S L. REP. 1.122 (1975).
23. This assumption was recognized as valid in Williamson v. Hampton Management
Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1972), where the court suggested in dictum that
a lessor's rejection of two single women could be lawfully based on the likelihood
that one would get married and cause the other to vacate. The statement, however,
is of dubious authority in view of the recent amendment to the fair housing laws
including "sex" as a protected category. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (Supp. V 1975),
amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1970).
24. See WOMEN & HoUsINO, supra note 6, at 13.
25. See id. ch. 2.
26. See id. at 41.
27. For instance, higher unemployment rates were reported for single males than
for single females in March, 1973. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1974 MANPOWER REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT, Table B-1 (Government Printing Office 1974).
28. In 1971, 80% of female-headed families had income other than earnings. The
largest proportion of these women had income from social security (34%) or public
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undependable sources must be examined. For example, if a woman
has received welfare regularly for a number of years, if she has young
children or a disability which will require her to remain on welfare,
and if she has paid her bills and lived within her budget, then she is
entitled to the same treatment as anyone with other sources of in-
come. 2 9  Likewise, a person receiving social security benefits has a
minimum income with guaranteed cost-of-living increases. 0 Although
other retirement or death benefit plans may not have similar guar-
anteed increases, such income is no less stable than is job-related in-
come.
More subtle discrimination results when women tenants are rejected
because they have children. Landlords often assume that children
make noise and cause damage, but this characteristic is not unique to
children."' Again, it should be those who actually have the undesir-
able characteristic that are excluded and not a group assumed to have
that characteristic. This discrimination against children has been ban-
assistance (30%). Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Facts About Women Heads
of'Households and Heads of Families 8 (April 1973).
29. In Male v. CrosSroads Assocs., 469 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1972), where the landlord
ignored welfare payments as a source of income, the court held that the resulting
exclusion of welfare recipients from a government subsidized housing project violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 622; see also Colon
v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But cf. Boyd
v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896
(1976) (economic criteria applied equally to all is not discrimination just because it
falls harder on minorities).
The rationale of Male supports the conclusion that considerations similar to those
employed by a landlord in evaluating welfare income are equally applicable to alimony
and child-support income. This is particularly true inasmuch as recent efforts to prose-
cute those who are delinquent in their support payments should contribute to the stabil-
ity df such income. Blake, Child-Support Enforcement Effort Grows Rapidly, L.A.
Times, Feb. 17, 1976, pt. II, at 1, col. 1.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 415(i) (Supp. V 1975).
31. To date, however, such discrimination has not been found actionable. In Flowers
v. John Burnham & Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971), when the
court was faced with a distinction based on the age and sex of children as tenants,
it balked at finding arbitrary discrimination. The landlord allowed girls of any age,
but boys over five were excluded. The court upheld the family's eviction "[blecause
the independence, mischievousness, boisterousness and rowdyism of children vary by
age and sex" and "[rlegulating tenants' ages and sex to that extent is not unreasonable
or arbitrary." Id. at 703, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 645. Moreover, at least one court has
held that restrictive covenants against children do not violate equal protection. Riley
v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974). Note, however, that a rejection in
part because of children and in part because of sex may be actionable. See notes
115-16 infra and accompanying text.
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ned in San Francisco by city ordinance.32 The San Francisco Board
of Supervisors found that such discrimination encourages families to
leave the city causing a "detrimental effect on the composition of the
City, the stability of neighborhoods, the preservation of family life
within the City, the living conditions of our children, the quality of our
schools, and the viability of children's activities and organizations. 3 3
While the San Francisco ordinance may indirectly mitigate sex dis-
crimination by prohibiting child-based exclusionary housing practices,
it does not provide a cause of action for sex discrimination. It is imper-
ative that such categorical restrictions be legally challenged so that the
scope of sex discrimination will become defined and all parties made
forcefully aware that sex-based discrimination is unlawful.
11. STATUTORY REMEDIES
Although the federal and state amendments to the fair housing laws
have given a fresh impetus to the enforcement of women's rights, all
have unique possibilities and limitations, and therefore should be an-
alyzed comparatively to elicit their particular strengths. The amend-
ments must also be compared to other federal and state remedies which
may on occasion be more appropriate. To facilitate the consideration
of the remedies available, a chart summarizing each statute in relation
to relevant considerations is presented:
STATUTE Title VIII: Private Action
42 U.S.C. § 3612
ACTION Civil action.
REMEDIES (1) Temporary restraining order,
3 4
(2) Preliminary and/or permanent injunction,
35
(3) Actual damages,36
(4) Punitive damages to $1,000,3 7
(5) Affirmative relief,38 and
32. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., POLICE CODE § 100 (1975).
33. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970). For a discussion of the relationship between the
use of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, see notes 184-86
infra and accompanying text.
35. Id.
36. Id. Actual damages may include mental anguish. See notes 194-95 infra and
accompanying text.
37. Id. For a comparison of punitive damages available under other statutes, see
notes 131, 204-06 infra and accompanying text.
38. Id. Affirmative relief would seem appropriate under the broad language of
§ 3612: "The court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any ... other
order . . . ." Id. For examples of affirmative relief that have been granted under
§ 3613, see note 187 infra. To date, however, no affirmative relief has been granted
solely on the basis of § 3612(c).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
DEFENDANTS
JURISDICTION
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
RELATION TO OTHER
REMEDIES
STATUTE
ACTION
REMEDIES
DEFENDANTS
(6) Reasonable attorney's fees, 3 9 or court appoint-
ment of an attorney.4 0
Person who engages in discriminatory housing prac-
tices4 1 in regard to all dwellings4 2 except:
(1) any single-family house sold or rented by any
owner who does not own more than three
houses, who does not use a real estate bro-
ker, and who does not advertise in a dis-
criminatory manner; or
(2) units intended to be occupied by no more
than four families, one of which the owner
occupies.43
(1) United States District Court.
(2) State court.
44
180 days from date of discriminatory act.
45
Requires no election or exhaustion of remedies,40
but the court may continue the case if HUD ap-
pears likely to achieve conciliation.
47
Title VIII: HUD Action
42 U.S.C. § 3610
HUD administrative action.
48
(1) Voluntary compliance of the landlord through
conciliation.4 9
(2) If conciliation fails, a private civil action for
injunctive and/or affirmative relief.5 0
(1) Same as under Title VIII private action. 51
(2) Owner of dwelling where discriminatory prac-
tice "is about to occur."
52
39. Id. § 3612(c). Reasonable attorney's fees will be granted to a prevailing plaintiff
who is "not financially able to assume [them]." Id. See notes 215-16 infra and accom-
panying text.
40. Id. § 3612(b). See note 214 infra.
41. Id. § 3604 (Supp. V 1975). See text accompanying note 127 infra.
42. Dwellings include mobile home sites. United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp.
1130, 1133 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 3603 (1970). See note 129 infra and accompanying text.
44. Id. § 3612(a). No minimum amount in controversy is necessary for jurisdiction.
Id.
45. Id.
46. Crim v. Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823, 826 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970). See text accompanying notes 233-34 infra.
48. HUD has regional offices throughout the United States where complaints may
be filed.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970) provides for the Secretary of HUD to use "informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."
50. Id. § 3610(d). For a discussion of the issues involved in proceeding with a
civil suit under this section, see notes 221-22, 236-40 infra and accompanying text.
For examples of affirmative relief that may be sought, see note 187 intra.
51. Id. § 3603. See notes 129-30 infra and accompanying text.
52. Id. I 3610(a).
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JURISDICTION
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
RELATION TO OTHER
REMEDIES
STATUTE
ACTION
REMEDIES
DEFENDANTS
JURISDICTION
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
(1) HUD for conciliation. 53
(2) United States District Court for civil action. 54
(1) For complaint to HUD, 180 days from date
of discriminatory act.55
(2) For civil action, 60 days from date of com-
plaint to HUD,56 provided HUD has not obtained
compliance, or 30 days from date of notification
from HUD that conciliation efforts have failed. 57
Requires exhaustion of "substantially equivalent"
state or local fair housing remedies.5 8
Title VIII: Attorney General Action
42 U.S.C. § 3613
Civil action by the United States Attorney
General. 59
(1) Temporary restraining order,60
(2) Preliminary and/or permanent injunction, 61
(3) Declaratory judgment, 62 and
(4) Affirmative relief. 63
Person or group that engages in a "pattern or prac-
tice" of discrimination in housing.
64
United States District Court.
65
No limit.
66
53. Id.
54. Id. § 3610(d). See notes 221-22 infra and accompanying text.
55. Id. § 3610(b).
56. Section 3610(d) provides that if the Secretary is unable to obtain, voluntary
compliance within thirty days after a complaint is filed, the person aggrieved has thirty
days in which to commence a civil suit. Id. § 3610(d). This provision allows for
a total of sixty days from the initial complaint to HUD in which to file suit in
a federal court. However, if the filing is more than 180 days from the date of the
discriminatory act, there is a" split of authority as to whether the civil action is time-
barred. See notes 239-40 infra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 236-40 infra and accompanying text.
58. Section 3610(c) requires HUD to refer the complaint to a state or local agency
if that agency has jurisdiction over "alleged discriminatory housing practices which
are substantially equivalent to the rights and remedies provided in this subchapter."
Id. § 3610(c). For a discussion of the impact of this provision on the effectiveness
of HUD procedures, see note 221 infra and accompanying text.
59. Id. § 3613.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. Accord, United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 218-19 n.19 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). See note 187 infra for examples of affirmative relief.
64. Id. See notes 133-35 infra.
65. Id.
66. In United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476, 485-86 (N.D. Ga. 1971), the
court held that neither a statute of limitations nor the, doctrine of laches applies to
suits by the United States in the public interest.
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RELATION TO OTHER Totally independent.
REMEDIES Individual complainant may bring private suit as
well.
6 7
STATUTE Conspiracy Statute
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
ACTION Civil action.
REMEDIES (1) Temporary restraining order,68
(2) Preliminary and/or permanent injunction,60
(3) Actual damages,
70
(4) Punitive damages, 71 and
(5) Attorney's fees.
72
DEFENDANTS Two or more persons who conspire and act to de-
prive a class of persons from enjoying equal pro-
tection in housing.
73
JURISDICTION (1) United States District Court. 74
(2) State court.1 5
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS No provision; hence "that state limitation period
which seems best to effectuate the federal policy
67. See Boyd v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 790, 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
68. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
The language of § 1985(3) only provides for damages. Yet, if the desired accom.
modation is to remain vacant for the plaintiff, then temporary restraining orders
and injunctions must also be available. Several courts have provided injunctive relief
under this statute, using other statutes as authority for granting it. See Brewer v.
Hoxie School Dist., 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956) (28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970) used
when necessary for jurisdiction to enjoin a conspiracy),; McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F.
Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973) (28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970)); Royal News Co. v. Schultz,
230 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Mich. 1964) (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1970); 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1343(3), 1343(4) (1970)). In addition, "the broad equitable jurisdiction of federal
courts supports the availability of such relief." McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. at
639. See note 184 infra and accompanying text.
69. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a); see also note 68 supra. A preliminary injunction
is difficult to obtain under § 1985(3). See Mullarkey v. Borglum, 323 F. Supp. 1218,
1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
"In a claim for the violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights damages are recov-
erable, nominal damages may be presumed, and such may in appropriate circumstances
support an award of exemplary damages." Tracy v. Robbins, 40 F.R.D. 108, 113
(D.S.C. 1966) (footnotes omitted).
71. See note 199 infra and accompanying text.
72. Attorney's fees are special damages which must be specifically pleaded under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(g). Maidmore Realty Co.
v. Maidmore Realty Co., 474 F.2d 840, 843 (3d Cir. 1973). For a discussion of
the awarding of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Acts, see note 217 Infra and
accompanying text.
73. For a discussion of the issues involved in a cause of action under § 1985(3), see
notes 140-55 infra and accompanying text.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(1) (1970).
75. Vason v. Carrano, 330 A.2d 98 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974).
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underpinning the claims asserted."' 76 In Califor-
nia, the applicable limitation is three years from
the date of the discriminatory act. 7
RELATION TO OTHER Requires no election or exhaustion of remedies. 73
REMEDIES
STATUTE "Color of Law" Statute
42 U.S.C. § 1983
ACTION Civil action.
REMEDIES (1) Temporary restraining order,
79
(2) PreliminarySO and/or permanent injunction, 81
(3) Declaratory judgment,
82
(4) Actual damages,83
(5) Punitive damages,8 4
(6) Affirmative relief,85 and
(7) Attorney's fees.86
DEFENDANTS Person who acts under "color of state law" to de-
prive another person of the right to equal pro-
tection in housing.87
JURISDICTION (1) United States District Court.88
(2) State court.
8 9
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS Same as for section 1985(3).90
RELATION TO OTHER Requires no election or exhaustion of remedies.9 1
REMEDIES
76. Peterson v. Fink, 515 F.2d 815, 816 (8th Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted).
77. Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1962). See notes 241-42 infra
and accompanying text.
78. Powell v. Workman's Comp. Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
79. See FED. R. Crv. P. 65(b); note 68 supra; see also note 184 infra and accompany-
ing text; Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964) (temporary restraining order
granted to prevent student suspension).
80. See FED. R. Crv. P. 65(a). See note 68 supra; see also note 184 infra and
accompanying text.
81. Section 1983 provides for a "suit in equity." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
82. Id.
83. Id. See notes 194-96 infra and accompanying text.
84. See note 199 infra and accompanying text.
85. Section 1983 provides for any other "proper proceeding for redress." While
this has generally been limited to injunctive relief, the court may direct the administra-
tion of a nondiscriminatory project necessary to assure compliance. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970); County School Bd. v. Thompson, 252 F.2d 929 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 958 (1958) (the court directed details of school integration because of prior viola-
tions of injunctive orders).
86. See notes 213-17 infra and accompanying text.
87. For a discussion of the problem of proving that defendant acted "under color
of law," see notes 162-66 infra and accompanying text.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
89. Lakewood Homes, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.E.2d 470, 502 (Ohio
C.P. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 267 N.E.2d 595 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971).
90. See notes 241-42 infra and accompanying text.
91. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 670-72 (1963).
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STATUTE
ACTION
REMEDIES
DEFENDANTS
JURISDICTION
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
RELATION TO OTHER
REMEDIES
Unruh Civil Rights Act
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51-53
Civil action.
(1) Temporary restraining order,
9 2
(2) Preliminary93 and/or permanent injunction,
9 4
(3) Declaratory judgment,95
(4) Actual damages,9 6
(5) Punitive damages,
97
(6) Statutory damages of at least $250 for each
offense up to treble damages,9 8 and
(7) Attorney's fees, in the court's discretion. 99
(1) Any person who discriminates in any housing
accommodation other than an owner-occupied
single-family dwelling, or
(2) Any person who aids, abets or incites such
discrimination.100
(1) California Superior or Municipal Court.101
(2) Small Claims Court.102
One year or three years from date of discriminatory
act.103
Requires election of remedy between this Act and
the Rumford Act, but can be used in conjunction
with other federal statutes.0
4
92. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527 (West Supp. 1977). See note 184 infra and accom-
panying text.
93. Id. §§ 526, 527. See note 184 infra and accompanying text. See also the
discussion of O'Beck v. Jackson in 7 Clearinghouse Rev. 219 (1973), where the Califor-
nia Superior Court granted a temporary restraining order and the case was then settled
by stipulation.
94. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1977); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 526-527
(West Supp. 1977); Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 470, 370 P.2d 313,
317, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 613 (1962).
95. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 51, 53 (West Supp. 1977). Section 53(c) provides for a
declaratory judgment that a discriminatory restriction or prohibition upon transfer of
real property in a written instrument is void.
96. CAL. Civ. CODE § 52(a) (West Supp. 1977). See notes 194-95 infra and accom-
panying text See also Colley, Civil Actions for Damages Arising Out of Violations
of Civil Rights, 17 HASTiNGS LJ. 189 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Colley].
97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970). See notes 121 & 204-06 infra and accom-
panying text
98. Id. § 52(a). See text accompanying note 203 infra.
99. Id.
100. Id. § 51 (West Supp. 1977); 56 CAL. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 546 (1973). See notes
174-75, 180 infra and accompanying text.
101. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 86(a) (West Supp. 1977).
102. Id. § 116.2. See notes 209-12 infra and accompanying text.
103. Id. § 340 (one year), § 338 (three years). For a discussion of which section
is more appropriately applied to the Unruh Act, see note 243 infra.
104. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35731 (West 1973). See Smith v. Cremins,
308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir, 1962).
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STATUTE
ACTION
REMEDIES
DEFENDANTS
JURISDICTION
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
RELATION TO OTHER
REMEDIES
Rumford Fair Housing Act
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35745
California Fair Employment Practices Commission
(FEPC) Action.
(1) Temporary restraining order and/or prelimi-
nary injunction, 1
05
(2) Sale or rental of the disputed housing accom-
modation if it is available, or
(3) Sale or rental of a like accommodation or the
promise of the next available one, or
(4) If (2) or (3) are not possible, damages to
$1,000,106 and
(5) Affirmative actions.10 7
(I) Owner of any dwelling that is rented, leased
or sold, other than an owner-occupied single-
family dwelling, who discriminates in housing
accommodations, or
(2) Anyone who aids, abets, incites, compels, or
coerces the discriminatory owner.10 8
FEPC. 0 9
(1) 60 days from the date of discriminatory act,
or
(2) 60 additional days if claimant learned of facts
of discriminatory' act after the initial 60-day
period.110
Requires waiver of rights and claims under the
Unruh Act."'
Im. PURSUIT OF A REMEDY
The various statutes have advantages and disadvantages which make
the desirability of each depend upon the complainant's situation and
105. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35734 (West 1973) provides for the FEPC
to obtain a temporary restraining order or preliminary or permanent injunction from
the superior court in accordance with CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 527 (West Supp. 1977).
See notes 184-85 infra and accompanying text.
106. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35738 (West Supp. 1977). This amendment
increased the maximum damages to $1,000 but retained the hierarchical form of relief.
See notes 191-93 infra and accompanying text.
107. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35711 (West Supp. 1977) defines "affirmative
actions" as "any educational activity for the purpose of eliminating discrimination in
housing accommodations . . . and any promotional activity designed to achieve such
a result on a voluntary basis." The FEPC is given authority to "engage in affirmative
actions with owners" to achieve this purpose. Id. For examples of affirmative relief,
see note 187 infra and accompanying text.
108. Id. § 35720. See notes 169-75 infra and accompanying text.
109. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35745 (West Supp. 1977).
110. Id. § 35731.
111. id. See note 234 infra.
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remedial goals. In selecting which statute[s] to pursue, a complainant
should consider: (1) whether the facts of her situation will constitute
a prima facie case under the desired cause of action; (2) what remedial
goals are desired-possession of the unit, compensation for costs, lost
time, and annoyance resulting from denial of the unit, vindication, de-
terrence, or publicity; and (3) what procedural concern is most im-
portant-cost, time, or effectiveness in achieving the remedial goal.
A. The Prima Facie Case
1. Federal Law
Each cause of action requires that the complainant make a prima
facie showing of discrimination. 11 2  Once it is shown that the landlord
has discriminated, "the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejec-
tion."" s  Although the landlord may state apparently valid policies for
selecting tenants, a policy that may appear "neutral on its face, cannot
stand if it in its operation serves to discriminate.""
' 4
112. Discrimination is present where it appears from the circumstances surrounding
the refusal that the dwelling would have been rented to the plaintiff were she of the
opposite sex. Because cases of purely sex-based discrimination have rarely been re-
ported, it is necessary to analogize from race-based discrimination cases to formulate
the criteria for determining what facts will constitute a prima facie showing. For
a discussion of the problem of proof of discrimination, see notes 12-20 supra and
accompanying text.
The cases involving purely sex-based discrimination in housing have not been decided
on the merits. Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) was dismissed on the pleadings for failure to allege facts constituting a conspiracy
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). Voloshen v. Jordan, P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HoUSINo
REP. BUL., 1 9.2 (Dec. 16, 1974), the first sex discrimination lawsuit filed under
title VIII, involved a landlord who refused to rent to a divorced woman and her son
because he felt she could not function adequately without a man in the house. This
case resulted in a consent decree. Other cases involving women as tenants have been
decided on other grounds of discrimination. See, e.g., Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty
Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970) (race); Thomas v. Housing Auth., 282 F. Supp.
575 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (unwed mother).
113. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 827 (8th Cir. 1974). Accord, United
States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 782 (N.D. Miss, 1972).
114. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 828 (8th Cir. 1974) (discrimination
on the basis of race). The rule is derived from Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971), wherein the Court ruled that requirements of high school graduation
and intelligence tests could not be used when unrelated to successful job performance,
and when serving to disqualify blacks at a disproportionately higher rate than whites.
Stated affirmatively, the selection criteria must be based on "business necessity." 401
U.S. at 431. Business necessity is "the absence of any acceptable alternatives that
will accomplish the same business goal with less discrimination." 499 F.2d at 828.
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The refusal to rent need not be based solely on the sex of the appli-
cant.115 As long as sex plays a role in the rejection, discrimination may
be established. Thus, if the applicant is refused because she is a
woman as well as because she has a child, the landlord is liable for
the sex-based discrimination even though he may have a right to dis-
criminate against children.116
For each cause of action, it must be alleged that defendant's acts
caused the plaintiff injury: for instance, deprivation of rights,' 17 damage
to feelings,"18 loss of money"19 or loss of the desired dwelling.' 20  If
punitive damages are sought, there must be sufficient allegations of ill
will or wanton and willful conduct by the defendant.'12  Where injunc-
tive relief is sought, there must also be claims of irreparable injury
and an inadequate remedy at law; 22 where attorney's fees are desired,
the plaintiff may be required to allege that she is financially unable to
assume that cost.'
23
Title VIII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1968124 provides for
a private civil action 25 and an administrative action through the De-
115. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 828 (8th Cir. 1974).
116. See id. at 826; Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th
Cir. 1970). In Smith, the landlord's acceptance of employed white married couples
with an infant and rejection of an employed single black woman with an infant showed
discriminatory application of a policy against renting to employed parents with infant
children. This was "an invalid excuse." 436 F.2d at 350.
117. Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 351 (7th Cir. 1970).
118. Id. See note 195 infra.
119. Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 383-84 (10th Cir. 1973) (cost of
storage was properly includable in damages).
120. See Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974); Steele v.
Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 383-84 (10th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty
Co., 436 F.2d 344, 350 (7th Cir. 1970).
121. See Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119, 1121 (7th Cir. 1974)
(punitive damages require a showing of ill will, malice, or a desire to injure the plain-
tiff); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1974) (the degree of
deliberateness necessary for punitive damages was shown by systematic discrimination;
each defendant was therefore liable for $1,000 under § 3612); Steele v. Title Realty,
478 F.2d 380, 384-85 (10th Cir. 1973) (no punitive damages recoverable where manager
was not motivated by ill will but by preferences of other tenants). See note 199 infra.
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 65; CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 527 (West Supp. 1977). See
also note 186 infra and accompanying text.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) limits attorney's fees to those complainants "not
financially able" to assume them. For a discussion of the construction of this provision,
see notes 215-16 infra and accompanying text.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3619 (Supp. V 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. H8 3601-3619
(1970).
125. Id. § 3612.
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partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 26 In either
action, the complainant must allege that the defendant did one or more
of the following: (1) refused because of the plaintiff's sex to make
a dwelling available; (2) discriminated against plaintiff because of sex
in the terms or provision of services in the sale or rental of a dwelling;
(3) publicly indicated a preference based on sex in the sale or rental
of a dwelling; or (4) because of plaintiff's sex, falsely represented that
a dwelling was not available for inspection, sale or rental.127  To in-
itiate an investigation through HUD, the complainant need merely al-
lege that she "will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing
practice that is about to occur.'
128
While title VIII applies to most multiple units available for rent,
there are limitations to its scope. Certain types of property and land-
lords are exempted from civil suits under both sections 3610 and
3612.129 Moreover, because HUD has no enforcement power, it is
limited to achieving equitable remedies through voluntary compli-
ance.' 30 Although a plaintiff may seek damages in a private civil ac-
tion under section 3612, punitive damages may not exceed $1,000.'"
Relief under section 3613 is limited to equitable remedies 132 but,
unlike HUD, the Attorney General may initiate a civil action where
"any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice
of resistance to the full enjoyment of the rights granted by this title
S. .[if] such denial raises an issue of general public importance."' 38
Whether "an issue of general public importance" is involved in a par-
ticular case is left to the discretion of the Attorney General,13 4 except
126. Id. § 3610.
127. Id. § 3604.
128. Id. § 3610(a).
129. Exempted are: (1) single-family houses sold or rented by an owner who does
not own more than three of these, who does not use a real estate broker, and who
does not advertise discriminatorily, id. § 3603(b); (2) dwellings containing units in-
tended for no more than four families, one of which is occupied by the owner, id.;
(3) structures or land intended for non-residence purposes, id.; and (4) religious and
non-profit organizations and private clubs. Id. § 3607.
130. Id. § 3610(a). See notes 228-31 infra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the effectiveness of utilizing HUD to achieve a remedy.
131. A court "may award to the plaintiff actual damages and not more than $1,000
punitive damages." Id. § 3612(c).
132. Id. § 3613 provides for "preventive relief, including an application for a perma-
nent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order . . . necessary to insure
the full enjoyment of the rights granted by this subchapter."
133. Id.
134. United States v. Northside Realty Assocs. Inc., 474 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (5th
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that a "pattern or practice" of discrimination requires more than a
single act of discrimination.
1 5
The conspiracy statute, section 1985(3), 1" 6 overcomes some of the
serious restrictions on title VIII actions: there is no limitation on dam-
ages137 or type of housing138 and the six month statute of limitations
is inapplicable. 3 ' Nonetheless, the prima facie case may be diffi-
cult to establish.
The elements necessary to establish a cause of action under section
1985(3) are well settled. The plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy
by two or more persons; (2) a conspiratorial purpose to deprive another,
as a member of a class, of the equal protection or the privileges and
immunities of the laws; (3) an overt act in furtherance of the con-
spiracy; and (4) resultant injury or deprivation of rights. 40  Although
section 1985(3) derives its authority from the enforcement clause of
the fourteenth amendment, 14 its purview includes private action.'
42
Cir. 1973); United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 122-25 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
135. United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 445 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d
115, 123-24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970). This statute provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws;
• . . if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his
person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action
for the recovery of damages.
Id.
137. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
138. See note 129 supra and accompanying text.
139. While §§ 3610(b) and 3612(a) specify that a complaint must be filed "within
one hundred and eighty days after the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred,"
§§ 1985(3) and 1983 are not so restricted. For the means of determining the statute
of limitations under these sections, see notes 236-42 infra and accompanying text.
140. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave.
Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117, 1121
(N.D. Ohio 1974).
141. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
142. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). The extent to which § 1985(3)
includes within its ambit private action remains an unsettled question. In two Seventh
Circuit opinions, Justice Stevens limited the categories of interests protected by § 1985
(3) to the federally protected right of racial equality, the right to interstate travel, and
rights derived from the fourteenth amendment which would require state action. Cohen
v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459
F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972). But cf. Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. '1975)
(no state action requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)); Westberry v. Gilman Paper
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The first element of the cause of action, a conspiracy, may be the
most difficult to prove. Where a landlord makes an individual decision
to rent to only one sex, there is no conspiracy since, by definition, a
conspiracy requires "two or more persons."'148 Even where a manager
acts as an agent for the owner, some courts have not found a conspir-
acy. 144  Other courts have construed the conspiracy requirement more
liberally, allowing its assertion "on more or less traditional principles
of agency, partnership, joint venture, and the like."'I4  Unless this
liberal position is accepted, it will be difficult to prove a conspiracy
without showing that the landlord acted in conjunction with another, 40
such as a rental agent, a publisher of a discriminatory advertisement,
an attorney who was involved in the contract, or a lender who had a
duty not to finance a discriminatory business. 47
The plaintiff need not specifically show the second element, that the
conspirators intended to deprive the plaintiff of her civil rights, 148 inas-
much as the focus of the action is on proving the overt discriminatory
Co., 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1975) (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) applies to purely private par-
ties).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
144. "[1f the challenged conduct is essentially a single act of discrimination by
a single business entity, the fact that two or more agents participated in the decision
or in the act itself will normally not constitute the conspiracy contemplated by this
statute." Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972). Accord, Milburn
v. Blackfrica Promotions, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 434, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Fallis v. Dunbar,
386 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1974). In a recent case, where corporate officers
refused to accept the assignment of a proprietary lease to a female tenant, no con-
spiracy was shown because the officers were part of a single business entity. Girard
v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
145. Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 126 (5th Cir. 1963). See also Rackin v.
University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1005-06 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (a complaint alleging
a conspiracy by a university and faculty to deprive plaintiff of her tenure on account
of sex stated a cause of action under § 1985(3)). Under this construction, an
agreement between co-owners, or between the owner and the manager, not to accept
members of a particular sex would constitute a conspiracy.
146. The narrow view will prevent § 1985(3) from overcoming some of the limits
of title VIII. Under § 3603(b) (1), the lessor of a single-family dwelling is liable only
if the services of a rental agent are used or if a discriminatory advertisement is placed,
unless more than three single-family dwellings are rented. Meeting the first condition
thus effectively requires a showing of a conspiracy by two or more persons. In a multi-
ple dwelling, the lessor will not be liable for discriminatory conduct if he resides in one
unit in a building intended for no more than four families. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2)
(1970). Thus the conspiracy statute, if liberally construed, can provide a cause of action
against lessors exempted by § 3603(b) (2).
147. Cf. Conner v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609,
73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (court found financer of housing development had duty
to buyers for major structural defects, but refused to find joint venture with developer).
148. Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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acts which caused plaintiff's injury.149 This focus was established in
Griffin v. Breckenridge,'5" where the Supreme Court held that the re-
quisite mental state is not a specific intent but a "class-based, invid-
iously discriminatory animus."'' Although this may be established
through circumstantial evidence, the requirement is strictly observed.15
2
While the Griffin Court expressly refrained from extending section
1985(3) to embrace non-racial discrimination, 5 ' subsequent circuit
opinions have acknowledged in dicta the possibility of such an exten-
sion 154 and several district courts have actually included sex as a pro-
tected class.'1 5
The use of section 1983150 in housing cases is more limited than the
other remedies, although like section 1985 it allows for expanded dam-
ages' 57 and an extended statute of limitations'5 8 which are not available
under title VIII. The prima facie showing of injury under section 1983
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate both a deprivation of rights, priv-
ileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States and the causation of such deprivation by a person acting under
color of state law.' 59 Although the plaintiff may claim denial of rights
149. In a civil conspiracy, the damage flows from the overt acts and not from the
conspiracy. "Therefore, the certainty we look for in a proper complaint under the Civil
Rights Statutes, is not in the general allegations of conspiracy, purpose, intent and color
of authority but the certainty and substance in the particular acts which are alleged to
have caused damage." Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 295 (9th Cir. 1959).
150. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
151. Id. at 102. Sufficient allegations of such animus have been found in a claim
of numerous denials of plaintiff's rights. Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1386 n.4
(6th Cir. 1972).
152. Hohensee v. Dailey, 383 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
153. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 n.9 (1971).
154. See Phillips v. Trello, 502 F.2d 1000, 1005 (3d Cir. 1974); Bricker v. Crane,
468 F.2d 1228, 1232 (lst Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1975); Hughes
v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6, 9 (4th Cir. 1972).
155. See Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Rackin v. Univer-
sity of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life
Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth
Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 386
F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
156. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . per-
son within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in-
jured in an action at law, a suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
157. See note 131 supra.
158. See note 139 supra.
159. Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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under either the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
or title VIII, 160 it is difficult to show that a landlord acted "under color
of state law."'161 While various tests have been devised for determining
whether a private individual is acting under color of state law, courts
in racial and sex discrimination cases have principally required that
state involvement be both "substantial" and "other than neutral,
' '102
going beyond minor regulation or funding of the housing entity.'03
Although most courts have hesitated to find that a private landlord's
utilization of judicial eviction procedures is action under color of state
law,0 4 action taken by public housing projects has consistently been
found to involve state action.165 Even where the entity is managed by
a private corporation, sufficient state involvement occurs where the
project is financed by an FHA mortgage, substantially assisted by city,
160. See, e.g., Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975); Weise
v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975); Smith' v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co.,
436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970).
161. Few housing units have the extensive supervision and subsidization necessary
for their discrimination to qualify as state action unless they are operated by the
public housing authorities. See note 163 infra and accompanying text.
162. Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Section 1983 "color of law" is equivalent to fourteenth amendment "state action." Id.
at 453.
163. The court in Barrio v. McDonough Dist. Hosp., 377 F. Supp. 317, 320 (S.D.
Ill. 1974), held that "to state a claim under Section 1983, it will be necessary for
any . . . complaint to allege facts in addition to the facts of state regulation and
the receipt of public funds . .. ."
164. In considering whether the landlord's use of the courts to evict a tenant on
account of sex amounted to state action because of both "substantial" and "other than
neutral" involvement, the court in Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp.
450, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), held that the state only provided an enforcement mechanism
for a contract "nondiscriminatory on its face." Girard is thus distinguishable from
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), where court enforcement of a restrictive cove-
nant discriminatory on its face amounted to state action. See also Fallis v. Dunbar,
386 F. Supp. 1117 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (tenant evicted for organizing a tenant's union);
Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (eviction of tenants and impressing
of lien pursuant to statute constituted state action); Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt,
299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (court eviction for organizing a tenant's union
labelled, in dictum, state action); Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App.
2d 242, 255, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309, 317 (1962) (defense could be raised in an unlawful
detainer action that the landlord was motivated by an unlawful bias "because such
'state action' would be violative of both federal and state Constitutions.").
165. See Thomas v. Housing Auth., 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967); see also Wil-
son v. Lincoln Redev. Corp., 488 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1973); Santiago v. Corporacion
de Renovacion Urbana y Vivienda, 453 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1972); Escalera v. Housing
Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Holmes v. Housing
Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
1977] SEX DISCRIMINATION
state and federal subsidies, and ultimately supervised by the state hous-
ing administration.1
66
2. California Law
In California, the Unruh Civil Rights Act0 7 and the Rumford Fair
Housing Act'68 have also been amended to include sex as a protected
category. The broad interpretation of these statutes to include all busi-
ness-related discriminatory housing practices 169 results in their applica-
tion to all rental property except non-publicly assisted, owner-occupied
single-family dwellings.'1
7
Under the Rumford Act, an aggrieved person may file a verified
complaint with the State Fair Employment Practices Commission (FE
PC) stating the name and address of the alleged violator and the par-
ticulars of the violation.
1 1
The Rumford Act prohibits the owner of publicly-assisted housing
from: (1) withholding housing because of a person's sex or marital
status; (2) discriminating because of sex or marital status in the terms or
166. Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(private corporation violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
and § 1983 by excluding welfare recipients from the project); Male v. Crossroads
Assocs., 469 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1972) (same as Colon).
167. CAL. Civ. CODE H9 51-53 (West Supp. 1977), amending CAL. CIV. CODE H9 51-
53 (West 1970).
168. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE H§ 35700-35745 (West Supp. 1977), amending CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE H§ 35700-35745 (West '1973).
169. Defendants under the statutes include: the developer of a housing tract, Burks
v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962); a real
estate broker, Lee v. O'Hara, 57 Cal. 2d 476, 370 P.2d 321, 20 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1962);
the owner of a triplex, Swann v. Burkett, 209 Cal. App. 2d 685, 26 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1962); and should also cover "an owner of a non-owner occupied single family dwelling
who sells, rents, or leases it for income or gain." 56 CAL. Op. ATr'y GEN. 546, 551
(1973).
170. The Rumford Act defines "publicly assisted" housing as any housing accommoda-
tion within the state:
(a) Which at the time of any alleged unlawful discrimination . . . is granted
exemption in whole or in part from taxes levied by the State or... its ... sub-
divisions ....
(b) Which is constructed on land sold below cost . . . pursuant to the Federal
Housing Act of 1949.
(c) Which is constructed in whole or in part on property acquired. . . through
the power of condemnation or otherwise for the purpose of such construction.
(d) The acquisition or construction of which is . . . financed in whole or in
part by a loan . . . guaranteed or insured by the federal government . . . or the
State ....
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35710(3) (West 1973).
171. Id. § 35731.
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services furnished in the provision of housing accommodations; (3) in-
quiring into the sex or marital status of a person seeking housing; (4)
retaliating against a person who has opposed these unlawful practices;
or (5) abetting the foregoing unlawful acts.' 72 Since it includes those
who are subject to the Unruh Act17 3 as well as those who aid or abet
the discriminatory practices, 74 the Rumford Act may be invoked not
only against owners of housing but also against managers, sub-lessors,
real estate brokers and agents who publish discriminatory advertise-
ments.
1 75
The Unruh Act,' 76 which provides for a private civil action, is more
comprehensive and flexible than most of the other statutes. It applies
to "all business establishments,"' 7  including all housing other than
owner-occupied single-family dwellings.1 78  Under section 52 of the
Civil Code, "whoever makes any discrimination, distinction or restric-
tion on account of sex" in a business establishment is liable.' This
172. Id. § 35720 (West Supp. 1977).
173. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-53 (West Supp. 1977).
174. CAL. HEALTH. & SAFETY CODE § 35720(6) (Wet Supp. 1977), providing in part
that the Rumford Fair Housing Act applies to all persons subject to the Unruh Act, has
formed the basis for the expansion of the scope of the Rumford Act. Although §
37520(5) exempts dwellings of four units or less, the Unruh Act applies to all business
establishments, regardless of size. The California Attorney General has concluded that
§ 37520(6) thus permits application of the Rumford Act to dwellings of less than
four units. 56 CAL. Op. A-r'Y GEN. 546 (1973). See Swann ir. Burkett, 209 Cal. App.
2d 685, 26 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1962); but see Hill v. Miller, 64 Cal. 2d 757, 415 P.2d 33,
51 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1966) (neither Unruh nor Rumford Act would support cause of ac-
tion for eviction from single-family dwelling on account of race).
175. See 53 CAL. Op. AT'rY GEN. 196 (1970) for a discussion that focuses on the
liability of real estate brokers but is applicable to all agents of the property owner.
176. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 51-53 (West Supp. 1977). Section 51 provides in pertinent
part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter
what their sex . . . are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, fa-
cilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments .of every kind whatsoever."
Id.
Section 52(a) provides:
Whoever denies, or who aids, or incites such denial, or whoever makes any dis-
crimination, distinction or restriction on account of sex. .. contrary to the provi-
sions of Section 51 of this code, is liable for each and every such offense for the
actual damages, and such amount as may be determined by a jury, or a court sit-
ting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the amount of actual damage,
but in no case less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250), and such attorney's fees
as may be determined by the court in addition thereto, suffered by any person
denied the rights provided in Section 51. . .of this code.
Id.
177. Id. § 51.
178. For application to brokers, see Vargas v. Hampson, 57 Cal. 2d 479, 370 P.2d
322, 20 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1962); Wagner v. O'Bannon, 274 Cal. App. 2d 121, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 44 (1969).
179. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a) (West Supp. 1977).
SEX DISCRIMINATION
provision has been interpreted to prohibit exclusion of a prospective
customer without reasons that are rationally related to the services per-
formed or facilities provided. 8 0
In order to establish a prima facie case under the Unruh Act, plaintiff
must allege that (1) she is a member of a protected class (women)
(2) who was within the jurisdiction of the State of California (3) when
she attempted to obtain housing accommodations (4) from named de-
fendant[s] at a specified location (5) but was denied the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges and services in defend-
ant's business establishment on account of her sex.'' To obtain actual
damages, plaintiff must allege resulting financial injuries or emotional
distress; to obtain punitive damages, plaintiff must allege intentional
and malicious conduct. 8 2  The Unruh Act additionally provides that
a person is entitled to treble damages of at least $250 for each of-
fense. 
8 3
B. Remedial Goals
Although the ability to meet the burden of proof initially governs
the selection of a cause of action, if more than one statute is available,
other factors must then be taken into account. If the primary goal is
to obtain the unit, the aggrieved party should initially seek a temporary
restraining order, either by separate motion or simultaneously with the
filing of the complaint. This immediate ex parte relief is available in
all statutory actions'8 4 except administrative actions through HUD.8 5
If irreparable injury can be demonstrated, the order will provide that
the property be kept vacant until a full hearing can be conducted. 8
180. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 217, 474 P.2d 992, 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 31 (1970).
"Our modem society has become so interdependent and interrelated that those who per-
form a significant public function may not erect barriers of arbitrary discrimination in
the marketplace." Id. at 218, 474 P.2d at 1000, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 32. In Cox, the ex-
clusion of an "unconventional" person from a public shopping center was found to be
arbitrary discrimination under the Unruh Act.
181. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1977). See Colley, supra note 96, at 200.
182. See notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text.
183. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a) (West Supp. 1977).
184. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612, 3613 (1970); FED. R. Civ. P. 65; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 527 (West Supp. 1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35734 (West 1973).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
186. FED. R. Civ. P. 65 and CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE § 527 (West Supp. 1977) have
similar provisions. Both allow the court to grant a temporary restraining order without
notice to the adverse party if it appears from facts shown by affidavit or verified com-
plaint that irreparable injury or loss will result before the adverse party can be heard,
and if adequate reasons support the claim that notice should be required.
When a plaintiff unsuccessfully attempts to rent a particular dwelling, the necessary
1977]
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Moreover, the restraint on further transactions involving the premises
will tend to encourage the expeditious processing of the case. Since
all of the statutes provide for equitable relief, the landlord may be com-
pelled to take specific action to prevent future discrimination. 87
Agency actions by the FEPC, HUD, or the Attorney General may ac-
complish the same goal with little cost or effort to the plaintiff. 8"
If expediency and effectiveness are of primary concern, however, they
may be frustrated through bureaucratic inefficiency.
8
Where a plaintiff's primary goal is to obtain damages, then the choice
between the statutes is of critical importance. While no damages are
available through the Attorney General or HUD actions, 190 in Califor-
nia, damages may be obtained through an FEPC action, but only under
prescribed circumstances.' Moreover, even though the amount of
facts usually exist to prove that irreparable injury is imminent. Once the landlord has
rented to another innocent tenant, the courts are reluctant to deny the new tenant the
unit. In fact, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970) provides that "a bona fide. . . tenant with-
out actual notice. . . of the filing of a complaint. . . shall not be affected." Moreover,
the equity courts have historically agreed that real property is unique and the loss of
it is not easily compensated. Kitchen v. Herring, 42 N.C. 137 (1851). The foregoing
also supports the argument that notice to the adverse party should not be required prior
to the issuance of the temporary restraining order, for notice would give the landlord
time to find an innocent tenant to occupy the dwelling.
If a temporary restraining order is granted without notice, the longest it may remain
in effect is twenty days. The federal rule allows an initial ten day period which may
be extended another ten days for good cause. FED. R. Civ. P. 65. The California rule
allows for an initial fifteen day period which may be extended to twenty days for good
cause. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527 (West Supp. 1977). Within that time period, at
the earliest possible date, a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction must be
held with both parties present or the temporary restraining order will be dissolved.
Both federal and California jurisdictions recognize the need for temporary injunctive
relief in housing discrimination cases pending a full hearing on the merits, for both title
VIII and the Rumford Act specifically make such relief available where necessary. See
also Brown v. Lo Duca, 307 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
187. Affirmative relief may require that defendant's advertising include the equal op-
portunity-in-housing symbol, that defendant's employees be instructed in fair housing
law, that written objective criteria for judging future applicants be established, and that
periodic reports on processing and acceptance of applicants be filed. United States v.
West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 229-31 (5th Cir. 1971).
188. See note 208 infra and accompanying text. In California the Attorney General
may bring a civil action or may intervene in a private action. CAL. CrV. CODE § 52(c),
(d) (West Supp. 1977).
189. See Bernstein, Shakeup in State Fair Practices Agency Needed, Officials Say, Los
Angeles Times, June 29, 1975, pt. I at 3, col. 3.
190. It is possible, however, for an individual to seek damages in a suit independent
of the Attorney General action. Boyd v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 790, 793 (E.D.
N.Y. 1972). It is also possible to obtain some compensation through a voluntary settle-
ment under the auspices of HUD. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 606.
191. If the housing unit or one similar to it is still available, then its sale or rental
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maximum damages has recently been increased from $500 to
$1,000,192 the FEPC has tended to award less than the maximum al-
lowed.193
All of the statutes providiig for private civil actions allow for actual
damages. 194  In most rental cases, large monetary losses occur only
when the plaintiff is forced to obtain more expensive accommodation
to replace the one that was denied or to incur unusual costs for traveling
and temporary shelter or storage. The largest claim for compensatory
damages in rental cases has usually been the emotional distress caused
by the arbitrary denial of housing.195 Although judges and juries may
not yet fully appreciate the humiliation that results from sex-based dis-
crimination, as they now do for racial discrimination, a lawyer can sensi-
tize the judge and jury to the assumptions that are made about women
is the relief plaintiff must take. Only if the FEPC determines that no like housing is
available may it award "the payment of damages to the aggrieved person in an amount
not to exceed one thousand dollars." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35738 (West
Supp. 1977).
192. Id.
193. Because FEPC cases are not published, there is no way to truly determine a pat-
tern. Only when an appeal is made to the state courts are the facts of a case made
public (even though a "public hearing" may have been held). From the few cases made
available, the tendency appears to be to grant the maximum damages only when exag-
gerated circumstances exist and to reduce the amount when more than one complainant
is involved to prevent too great an overall award.
Two unpublished FEPC decisions are illustrative. Where a single black complainant
had been put in fear of harrassment if he took the apartment, he was granted the full
$500 in damages (now the maximum is $1,000). In re Accusation of Percy Wimer,
Case No. FHL72-73-B8-112 L7608 (Cal. FEPC, Dec. 27, 1974). But where two black
complainants were refused the rental of an apartment because the landlord falsely
claimed their credit application was lost and showed they were poor risks, they were
granted $300 each. In re Accusation of M. Possey, Case No. FHL72-73-A8-069 N4925
(Cal. FEPC, Feb. 28, 1975).
In Steams v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 6 Cal. 3d 205, 490 P.2d 1155, 98
Cal. Rptr. 467 (1971), only $250 in damages was awarded to a prospective black tenant
who had been required to wait for a credit check before being accepted, while a white
applicant was offered the apartment without one.
194. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612, 1983, 1985(3) (1970); CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a) (West Supp.
1977). See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (§ 1983 construed to include
actual damages).
195. "[Ain award of. . . actual damages under § 3612 is appropriate for humiliation
caused by the type of violation of rights established here. Humiliation can be inferred
from the circumstances as well as established by the testimony." Seaton v. Sky Realty
Co., 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974) (award of $500 given for mental anguish caused
by racial discrimination in the sale of a house). See also Steele v. Title Realty Co.,
478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973) ($1,000 compensatory damages mainly for mental suffer-
ing); Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1971) (trial court to
determine on remand damages up to $1,000 for mental anguish).
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in their search for housing. Sizable awards have been given for mental
anguish in racial housing cases, 190 and should be obtainable for sex-
based discrimination as well. A plaintiff can maintain a cause of action
even though her housing needs have been met -elsewhere and even
after the landlord has offered her the property in settlement, since the
discriminatory treatment itself is a compensable injury.'
97
Other plaintiffs may want to vindicate rights to equal accommoda-
tions by punishing the defendant and by making the cost of discrimina-
tion sufficiently onerous to deter future arbitrary denials of housing.
For these complainants, the administrative remedies will prove un-
satisfactory because of the limitation to injunctive relief and minimal
damages.' 98 Of the civil remedies, title VIII is the least desirable,
because punitive damages are limited to $1,000."'1 Sections 1983 and
1985(3) do not impose such limitations and can potentially be the
sources of the highest damage awards. Because of the potentially un-
limited damages offered by the Civil Rights Acts, most racial discrim-
ination cases have included a cause of action under section 1982.200
196. See note 195 supra.
197. Neither the settlement of the parties as to the rental of the apartment nor
the awarding of costs and waiver of fees and security moots the question of dam-
ages. . . . Indeed section 3612 . . . is a strong congressional condemnation of
unlawful discrimination in housing. Such a provision prevents a landlord from
following a wilful pattern of discrimination or from resisting certain applicants
and withdrawing his resistance when the applicant seeks relief by court litigation,
without an accounting therefor.
Cash v. Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 1970) (injunctive relief be-
came moot when the plaintiff accepted the apartment). Compare Brown v. Ballas, 331
F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (although the plaintiff had found other housing, she
was still able to recover $750 in actual damages and $500 in attorney's fees under a
42 U.S.C. § 1982 cause of action).
198. See notes 49-50, 105-07, 191 supra and accompanying text.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970). Even though the language of the statute provides
for punitive damages without specifying any required showing, courts have only granted
them to the extent that willful or wanton conduct has been demonstrated. Steele v. Title
Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973). See Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d
819 .(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021, 1027 (1974) (up to $1,000 in punitive dam-
ages under §§ 3612 and 1982); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.
1974) ($1,000 in punitive damages awarded against each of three defendants under
§ 3612); Allen v. Gifford, 368 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973) ($5,000 in punitive
damages under § 1982); Marshall v. Pendley, P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HOUSINo [Transfer
Binder] 11 13,615, at 14012 (N.D. Ga. 1973) ($9,593 total award including $350 for
humiliation and $1,000 punitive damages awarded to each of five plaintiffs for racial
discrimination under § 3612). See also Colley, supra note 96.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) has been construed to bar "all racial discrimination,
private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). As a § 1982 claim may be supported by merely showing
the fact of discrimination, most racial discrimination claims prosecuted by private action
have been brought under that section.
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While sex-based discrimination is not prohibited by section 1982, the
same advantages may be obtained through sections 1983 and 1985(3)
if creative investigation is used to show that the landlord acted under
color of law2 "1 or as part of a conspiracy.202
In California state courts, the most advantageous statute for large
punitive awards is the Unruh Act. In addition to providing for actual
damages, there may be statutory damages of at least $250 and up to
treble damages, as well as attorney's fees for each "offense . . . suf-
fered by any person denied the rights provided in section 51 .... ,,203
Moreover, the possibility of additional punitive damages when the de-
fendant landlord is "guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice" 20 4 can
greatly increase the plaintiff's recovery. In a clear case of discrimina-
tion, all that must be proved is the wrongful intent to discriminate.
20 5
The California Supreme Court has recognized that statutory damages
provisions do not preclude additional punitive damages when appropri-
ate. 2
00
C. Procedural Concerns
Although most plaintiffs are primarily concerned with the remedial
goals of specific relief and compensation, the procedural concerns of
cost, time, and effectiveness may nonetheless limit the choice of stat-
utory remedy.
1. Cost
The cost of seeking a remedy is a major concern to a large portion
of potential plaintiffs inasmuch as most of these women are in low to
middle income groups.20 7 For these plaintiffs, the agencies may pro-
vide reasonable relief. Neither HUD nor the FEPC charges for in-
201. See notes 159-66 supra and accompanying text.
202. See notes 143-46 supra and accompanying text.
203. CAL CIV. CODE § 52(a) (West Supp. 1977).
204. Id. § 3294 (West 1973) provides:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or irfiplied, the
plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the defendant.
205. See Colley, supra note 96, at 201. For discussion of the relationship between
intent and punitive damages in a non-discrimination context, see Roth v. Shell Oil Co.,
185 Cal. App. 2d 676, 8 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1960).
206. Greenberg v. Western Turf Ass'n, 140 Cal. 357, 73 P. 1050 (1903); Piluso v.
Spencer, 36 Cal. App. 416, 172 P. 412 '(1918); see also Baum, Statutory Controls of
Damages in Commercial Transactions, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 191 (1960).
207. In 1973, 85.6% of the working women in the United States earned less than
$10,000. U.S. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T oF LABoR, THE E NINos GAP 2 (Table
2: Earnings of Year-Round Full-Time Workers by Sex, 1973) (March, 1975).
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vestigatory or conciliatory efforts. Where obvious discrimination is
present and the complainant presents the hearing officer with the in-
formation necessary for easy investigation, the FEPC may obtain the
desired housing.
208
A civil action may be brought for a nominal fee in the small claims
court.2 0 9 The need for an attorney is eliminated,21 0 but acting without
counsel will be effective only if plaintiff is articulate or especially well
prepared to present the legal issues. Aside from the limited relief,
21 '
the most serious drawback is the denial to plaintiff of the right of ap-
peal. 2
12
In a conventional civil action, the financial burden of bringing an
action may be shifted to the defendant through the inclusion of costs2
13
and attorney's fees in the award. Moreover, in actions brought under
title VIII, a court-appointed attorney will be provided where appropri-
ate. 14 Where plaintiff retains private counsel, attorney's fees may be
208. While the FEPC has the power necessary to obtain the landlord's compliance,
this power is used only where the evidence of discrimination is clear. Moreover, the
FEPC has increasingly shown a reluctance to find sufficient evidence of discrimination.
In the period 1963-74, the FEPC found no discrimination in 35% of the complaints,
but in the period 1973-74, it found no discrimination in 54% of the complaints. FEPC
REP. JULY 1, 1972-J NE 30, 1974, at 34 (Table 12: Housing Cases Closed: Type of
Dispositions) (1975). The likelihood of obtaining the housing is even less through
HUD than through the FEPC. See notes 220-23 infra and accompanying text.
209. The fee is $2 for filing or for mailing a copy of the claim, and $1.50 for issuance
of a writ of execution. CAL. Cxv. PROc. CODE § 118.6 (West Supp. 1977); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 72065 (West 1976).
210. Representation by an attorney is not permitted, although an attorney may advise
a party either before or after commencement of the action. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §
117.4 (West Supp. 1977).
211. Damages are limited to $750 and injunctive relief is unavailable. Id. § 116.2.
212. Id. § 117.8.
213. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1031 and 1032 (West Supp. 1977) provide that the
prevailing party, whether plaintiff or defendant, is entitled to costs in both municipal
and superior courts under specified conditions.
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) provides: "Except when express provision is made either in
a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of
course to the prevailing party, unless the court otherwise directs." Note that 42 U.S.C.
§ 3612(c) (1970) limits an award of costs to a prevailing plaintiff whereas in an action
brought under Civil Rights Acts subject to rule 54(d), the defendant also may
be awarded costs.
In federal court, costs are limited to court fees, such as filing fees, service-of-process
fees, and witness fees. C. WRIHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 2666 (1973). In California, costs include deposition and jury fees as well.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1032a, 1032.5 (West 1972).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b) (1970) provides in part:
Upon application by the plaintiff and in such circumstances as the court may deem
just, a court of the United States in which a civil action under this section has been
brought may appoint an attorney for the plaintiff and may authorize the commence-
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recovered if plaintiff is not financially able to bear the cost.215 While
courts have been quick to find such inability,2 16 recovery of attorney's
fees under sections 1983 and 1985(3) is potentially more limited. 217
The Unruh Act allows recovery of attorney's fees.218
ment of a civil action upon proper showing without the payment of fees, costs,
or security. A court of a State. . . may do likewise ....
Id.
215. Id. § 3612(c).
216. Adoption of indigency as the test would summarily preclude recovery of any
fees by persons with the financial ability to own any kind of home or to seriously
seek home ownership. . . . Therefore, the Court will consider financial inability
within the special context of § 3612(c) to mean a homeowner or prospective home-
owner of limited financial ability who clearly lacks the resources to fight a legal
battle under the "anti-blockbusting" Act without endangering his status as a home-
owner or potential homeowner.
Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F. Supp. 291, 297-98 (D. Md. 1973). The same approach has
been adopted in rental housing cases. In Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339
F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1972), the court awarded $750 in attorney's fees where the
combined income of the two plaintiffs totaled $15,000.
The motive for this generosity was perhaps explained by the United States Supreme
Court:
[M]ost of the fair housing litigation conducted by the Attorney General is handled
by the Housing Section of the Civil Rights Division, which has less than two dozen
lawyers. Since HUD has no enforcement powers and since the enormity of the
task of assuring fair housing makes the role of the Attorney General in the matter
minimal, the main generating force must be private suits in which . . . the com-
plainants act not only on their own behalf but also "as private attorneys general
in vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority."
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
217. Courts have traditionally been liberal in the awarding of attorney's fees to pre-
vailing plaintiffs in actions brought under the Civil Rights Acts. The rationale has been
thus explained:
The violation of an important public policy involves little by way of actual
damages, so far as a single individual is concerned, or little in comparison with the
cost of vindication, as the case at bar illustrates. If a defendant may feel that the
cost of litigation, and, particularly, that the financial circumstances of an injured
party may mean that the chances of suit being brought, or continued in the face of
opposition, will be small, there will be little brake upon deliberate wrongdoing. In
such instances public policy may suggest an award of costs that will remove the
burden from the shoulders of the plaintiff seeking to vindicate the public right.
Knight v. Aucilleo, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972). See also Newman v. Piggie
Park Ent., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); Lee v. Southern Homes Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th
Cir. 1971).
The decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)
may hinder plaintiffs from recovering attorney's fees. The Court there held that a pre-
vailing litigant is not entitled to attorney's fees absent statutory provision. So long as
the plaintiff prevails under title VIII, Alyeska will pose no obstacle, inasmuch as § 3612
includes the necessary provision. Rios v. Steanfitters Local 638, 400 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.
N.Y. 1975). Despite the absence of statutory authority, it may still be possible to re-
cover the fees. In Morris v. Board of Educ., 401 F. Supp. 188 (D. Del. 1975), attor-
ney's fees were awarded where a black teacher was not retained because of racial dis-
crimination and the defendant conducted a bad faith defense. Alyeska was distin-
guished; the defendant "knew that the position taken by him in defense of this case was
meritless." Id. at 215.
218. CAL. Civ. CODE § 52(a) (West Supp. 1977).
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2. Time
A major concern of a plaintiff who desires to rent a disputed unit
is the ability to secure a swift remedy. If such a remedy is unavailable,
the unit will be rented to someone else,21 9 and the plaintiff may have
to rent another dwelling or continue in temporary quarters, either of
which may be expensive or inconvenient.
Although section 3614 provides for assignment for hearing "at the
earliest practicable date, ' 220 the administrative action through HUD has
not been given the same urgency. Because HUD has no authority to
obtain a temporary restraining order or injunction, the unit cannot be
kept available until the case is settled. HUD has thirty days in which
to secure voluntary compliance from the landlord, but this may be too
long to prevent an innocent tenant from taking possession. Further
delay may result when the state wherein the complaint arose has "sub-
stantially equivalent" rights and remedies. HUD must then refer the
complaint to the appropriate local agency for resolution and only when
that agency fails to commence proceedings within thirty days may HUD
undertake its own conciliation efforts.22' If HUD cannot obtain a con-
ciliation agreement within thirty days, the aggrieved person then has
thirty days in which to file a complaint in district court. 2  Thus, it
is apparent that use of HUD to obtain specific relief is likely to prove
219. Section 3612(a) protects the innocent lessee and provides in part:
That any sale, encumbrance, or rental consummated prior to the issuance of any
court order issued under the authority of this Act, and involving a bona fide pur-
chaser, encumbrancer, or tenant without actual notice of the existence of the filing
of a complaint or civil action under the provisions of this Act shall not be affected.
42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970). This provision applies to actions brought under § 3610
as well, since § 3610(d) makes § 3610 actions "subject to the provisions of § 3612."
220. Id. § 3614 provides: "Any court in which a proceeding is instituted under section
3612 or 3613 of this title shall assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date
and cause the case to be in every way expedited."
221. Id. § 3610(c) provides in part:
Wherever a State or local fair housing law provides rights and remedies for al-
leged discriminatory housing practices which are substantially equivalent to the
rights and remedies provided in this subchapter, the Secretary shall notify the appro-
priate State or local agency of any complaint filed which appears to constitute a
violation of such . . . law, and the Secretary shall take no further action . .. if
the appropriate .. . official has, within thirty days . . . commenced proceedings
California's fair housing laws have been tentatively recognized to be substantially equiv-
alent to the federal fair housing laws. 24 C.F.R. § 115.12 (1977).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970). There is a split in the jurisdictions as to whether
the thirty-day period is tolled until notification is received from HUD of failure to ob-
tain compliance, if this period is longer than 180 days from the date of the discrim-
inatory act. See notes 238-40 infra and accompanying text.
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frustrating, since the potential delays inherent in HUD procedures
make immediate satisfaction of the complaint unlikely.
223
Although sections 1983 and 1985(3) contain no provisions for ex-
pediting the court proceedings, the availability of temporary restraining
orders and preliminary injunctions2 4 will effectively compensate for
this deficiency. Further hastening of the resolution of the case is pos-
sible through consolidation of the initial hearing with the trial on the
merits.225
The FEPC has maintained a policy of giving priority to housing
cases,226 since the administrative action was devised to procure compli-
ance cheaply and efficiently:
In providing an administrative remedy for housing discrimination the
Legislature undertook to make sure that individual actions did not be-
come burdened with procedural technicalities.
To achieve this end the FEPC established procedures that are as
simple and uncomplicated as possible. Complaints are drafted by lay-
men; the commission informally attempts to eliminate discriminatory
practices before instituting formal accusations; the commission, on a
finding of discrimination, may fashion remedies both to correct unique
cases of such practice as well as to curb its general incidence.
227
3. Effectiveness
It is finally necessary to determine which statutes are most effective
in achieving the complainant's remedial goals. From all standpoints,
the procedures employed by HUD have the least potential for success.
Not only are delays and inefficiency built into the system, but HUD
lacks any enforcement powers. 228  Furthermore, if actions are pending
under both sections* 3610 and 3612,229 the district court must continue
223. The success record of HUD has been less than satisfactory. In 1971, for ex-
ample, of 1,570 complaints, there were only 351 completed conciliations, 204 of which
were successful. Chandler, Fair Housing Laws: A Critique, 24 HASTINNGS L.J. 159,
190-91 (1973).
224. FED. R. Crv. P. 65.
225. Id. 65(a) (2). In California, consolidation is provided for in CAL. CiV. PROC.
CODE § 1048(a) (West Supp. 1977), which gives the court discretion to order consolida-
tion "of any or all the matters in issue in the actions. . . as may tend to avoid unneces-
sary costs or delay."
226. Interview with Leonora Stopol, Attorney, FEPC, in Los Angeles (July 11,
1975).
227. Stearns v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 6 Cal. 3d 205, 214, 490 P.2d
1155, 1161, 98 Cal. Rptr. 467, 473 (1971).
228. See notes 221-23 supra and accompanying text.
229. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (1970).
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the civil case if it "believes that the conciliation efforts of the Secretary
or a State or local agency are likely to result in satisfactory settle-
ment. 2 °30  Thus, HUD's procedural delays can be avoided only by pur-
suing civil remedies exclusively."8' Moreover, the initiation of a civil
action with its attendant bad publicity and costs for defendant will en-
courage speedy settlement.
In contrast, the FEPC has broader powers than HUD. The FEPC
has the power to seek a temporary restraining order on behalf of the
complainant as soon as sufficient evidence of discrimination is deter-
mined to exist.232  It can also make findings of fact and issue cease
and desist orders requiring the landlord to make a dwelling available
or to respond in damages.283 Seeking relief through the FEPC, how-
ever, has its drawbacks. The complainant must waive all rights under
the Unruh Act,23 4 and must accept either a promise of housing (which
may never be fulfilled) or monetary compensation; the complainant is
unlikely to obtain both unless they are included in the settlement agree-
ment.23
5
The primary remedial advantage of a civil action is the potential for
a damage award. Where plaintiff obtains a verdict, monetary compen-
sation is more likely to be awarded in addition to injunctive relief, par-
ticularly where counsel can sensitize the fact-finder to the cost of find-
ing alternative shelter and the mental anguish of arbitrary refusal.
230. Id. § 3612(a).
231. This is so despite the judicial view that §§ 3610 and 3612 form alternative
remedies. Crim v. Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Johnson v. Decker, 333
F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
232. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35734 (West 1973).
233. Id. § 35738 (West Supp. 1977).
234. Id. § 35731 (West 1973). The statute provides in part: "However, no such
complaint [by the FEPCI may be made or filed unless the person claiming to be ag-
grieved waives any and all rights or claims that he may have under Section 52 of the
Civil Code and signs a written waiver to that effect." Id. At the time that the com-
plainant signs the waiver, FEPC practice is to inform her regarding the waived rights.
Nonetheless, the complainant may not appreciate the implications of such a waiver, par-
ticularly when unassisted by counsel. Note, however, that the waiver is directed only
to Unruh Act rights; the complainant is not foreclosed from bringing a federal action.
235. Interview with Leonora Stopol, Attorney, FEPC, in Los Angeles (March 1,
1976). For the hierarchy of relief established by the Rumford Act, see note 191 supra.
This hierarchy is also followed when the FEPC seeks a voluntary settlement agreement.
Accordingly, few settlements involve both injunctive and monetary relief. Id.
-Moreover, the likelihood of recovering just monetary relief through the FEPC is
slight. In 1972-73, of 173 housing cases closed, only 35 involved a monetary settle-
ment; in 1973-74, of 115 housing cases closed, only 5 involved a monetary settlement.
FEPC REPORT, JULY 1, 1972-JUNE 30, 1974, at 37 (Table 16: Housing Cases Closed
by Corrective Action: Type of Corrective Action) (1975).
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D. The Statute of Limitations
The running of the limitations period for all statutes herein considered
begins on the date on which the discriminatory act occurred. The
period for title VIII actions is 180 days,236 but computation of the
period is complicated when HUD conciliation is invoked. HUD has
thirty days to secure compliance; upon expiration of that period, the
complainant has thirty days in which to bring an action in district
court.28 7 Considerable confusion exists over the relationship between
this latter thirty-day period and the usual limitations period of 180 days.
Some courts have ruled that the civil action must be filed within 180
days of the discriminatory act, irrespective of when the HUD action was
commenced or when HUD notified the complainant of failure to obtain
compliance.238 Other courts have ruled that the complainant has 180
days in which to commence the HUD action and 60 days thereafter to
file.239  Still other courts have ruled the 180 day period irrelevant, so
long as the district court action is commenced within thirty days follow-
ing notice of HUD's failure to obtain compliance.24 °
The limitations period for sections 1983 and 1985(3) is determined
by reference to the most closely related statute of the state where the
cause of action arose. 24' This often results in a much longer period
than is possible under title VIII. In California, for example, the period
is three years.242 The limitations period is probably three years for
the Unruh Act also, 243 and a maximum of 120 days for the Rumford
236. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610(b), 3612(a) (1970).
237. Id. § 3610(d).
238. Hodge v. Seiler, P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HousING [Transfer Binder] 13,729 (E.D.
La. 1975).
239. Brown v. Blake & Bane, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1975); Young v. AAA
Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
240. Gandy v. Pierson, P-H EQUAL OPP. n HousiNG [Transfer Binder] Y 13,735
(E.D.N.C. 1975); Logan v. Richard E. Carmack & Assocs., 368 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.
Tenn. 1973); Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
241. Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962).
242. Willis v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187
(9th Cir. 1962); Williams v. Harvath, 45 Cal. App. 3d 422, 119 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1975).
243. The applicable statute of limitations depends upon whether the Unruh Act pro-
vides for a liability created by statute or for a penalty. If a liability is created by stat-
ute, the limitations period is three years. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 338(1) (West Supp.
1977). For a penalty, the limitations period is one year. Id. § 340.
No court has yet determined whether the one year or the three year period governs
Unruh Act actions. While the remedy provided in the predecessor statute to the Unruh
Act was once termed a penalty, Greenberg v. Western Turf Ass'n, 140 Cal. 357, 364
73 P. 1050, 1052 (1903), other analogous provisions have been held to have a three year
period. Culver v. Bell & Loffland, 146 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1974) (additional recovery
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that there are real differences in the efficacy and po-
tential remedies of each of the actions previously described. For those
complainants willing to seek redress only through an agency, where
little cost and effort are required, the FEPC action is preferable to
HUD inasmuch as an FEPC action may result in injunctive or monetary
relief; HUD can only pursue unenforceable conciliation efforts.
Of the civil actions, the best overall remedy available in California
is an action brought pursuant to the Unruh Civil Rights Act since its
purview includes the widest range of defendants and conduct and pro-
vides for money damages as well as injunctive relief. However, where
assurance of attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff is important, a title
VIII cause of action should be pursued. Where possible, sections 1983
or 1985(3) should be pleaded as an alternative to section 3612 of title
VII.
As awareness of the illegality of discrimination is heightened, women
will be encouraged to charge a landlord with a violation of fair housing
laws instead of merely searching elsewhere for housing. As a conse-
quence, landlords too will recognize their vulnerability to legal action
if they discriminate on the basis of sex. The result of this process will
be an equal opportunity for all to housing.
Elyse Salinger Kline
for employees not paid for overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C, §
216(b) (1970)); Farris v. San Diego Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 140 F. Supp. 703 (S.D.
Cal. 1956) (treble damage provision); Holland v. Nelson, 5 Cal. App. 3d 308, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 117 (1970) (treble damage provision).
The test of whether a statute provides for a penalty is "whether its purpose is to pun-
ish an offense against the public justice of the State, or to afford a private remedy to
a person injured by the wrongful act." Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74
(1892). The Unruh Act has been described as "a minimum [that] has been fixed for
the invasion of. . . civil rights." People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 458, 282 P.2d 905,
919 (1955) (dicta) (dissenting opinion). Accordingly, the $250 mandatory recovery
under the Unruh Act appears to provide for a minimum recovery rather than a penalty;
hence, it is subject to the three year period.
244. CAL. HEALTu & SAFmrn CODE § 35731 (West 1973).
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